Trump Seeks New Import Fees to Replace the Tariffs the Supreme Court Rejected

On February 20, 2026, the supreme court of the united states handed President Trump the most consequential judicial defeat of his second term a 6-3 ruling that declared his sweeping global tariffs unconstitutional and dismantled, at least temporarily, the centerpiece of his economic agenda. Within 48 hours, the White House had a workaround in motion. Within weeks, it had a longer-term strategy under construction. The question now is whether any of it survives legal scrutiny and what happens to the more than $200 billion already collected.

What the Supreme Court Ruled

The case, Learning Resources Inc. v. Trump, was brought by importers challenging tariffs Trump had imposed using the International Emergency Economic Powers Act a 1977 law historically used for sanctions and asset freezes, not broad-based trade taxes. The trump supreme court showdown had been anticipated for months, with legal scholars divided on whether IEEPA could support the sweeping tariff regime the administration had built on it.

Chief Justice John Roberts, joined by Justices Sotomayor, Kagan, Gorsuch, Barrett, and Jackson, ruled that it could not. The majority opinion concluded that “IEEPA does not authorize the President to impose tariffs,” drawing a sharp constitutional line between the power to “regulate importation” which IEEPA permits and the power to tax, which the Constitution reserves exclusively to Congress. Invoking the “major questions” doctrine, the Court held that when a president attempts to exercise powers of vast economic significance, Congress must have delegated that authority explicitly. It had not.

Justices Thomas, Kavanaugh, and Alito dissented. The US supreme court’s majority, however, was clear: the tariff structure Trump had spent years building on IEEPA authority was invalid.

The Immediate Workaround: Section 122

Two days after the ruling, the administration moved to fill the vacuum. Trump announced a 10% global import surcharge under Section 122 of the Trade Act of 1974 a mechanism that allows the president to impose temporary tariffs of up to 15% to address “fundamental international payments problems.” The supreme court tariffs ruling had killed IEEPA; Section 122 was the emergency patch.

The new surcharge took effect February 24 and is set to expire July 24, 2026 a hard statutory limit of 150 days built into Section 122 that the president cannot unilaterally extend. Trump indicated he would raise the levy to the 15% ceiling, but had not done so as of late April.

Section 122 is already facing legal challenge. A coalition of state Attorneys General filed suit in early March, arguing that the statute was designed for currency crises following the collapse of the Bretton Woods fixed-exchange-rate system in 1976 not trade deficits. Their position: the president cannot satisfy Section 122’s statutory requirements by redefining what a “balance of payments” problem means. If that challenge succeeds, the backup plan collapses before the summer.

The Longer Game: Section 301

Aware that Section 122 was a stopgap, the U.S. Trade Representative’s office launched a more durable legal architecture in March. On March 11, USTR initiated Section 301 investigations into 16 economies for manufacturing overcapacity the argument being that state-subsidized overproduction in foreign markets constitutes an unfair trade practice that justifies retaliatory tariffs. On March 12, a separate wave of investigations targeted 60 economies for failing to effectively prohibit imports produced with forced labor.

The breadth is striking: those 76 overlapping investigations cover countries that account for more than 99 percent of all U.S. imports. Analysts at the Cato Institute described the exercise plainly the investigations will produce tariffs that “approximate what the Supreme Court overruled in February.”

Section 301 tariffs have significant legal and structural advantages over IEEPA and Section 122. They have no size cap, survive for four years before requiring renewal, and critically they withstood judicial challenges during Trump’s first term. Public hearings on forced labor began April 28; overcapacity hearings begin May 5. The timeline suggests tariffs under this authority could be finalized by late summer, roughly coinciding with Section 122’s expiration.

What Happens to the $200 Billion Already Collected

The US supreme court ruling left unresolved one of the most consequential financial questions in modern trade law: whether importers who paid IEEPA tariffs are entitled to refunds. The majority opinion invalidated the tariffs but declined to address remedies. That question is now winding through the courts.

As of early April, more than 56,000 importers and notification parties had registered with the U.S. Customs and Border Protection to receive electronic refunds. CBP indicated it can process refunds for approximately 82 percent of affected entries suggesting a potential repayment exercise of historic scale, though its precise dimensions remain undefined pending further litigation.

For American businesses that restructured supply chains, renegotiated contracts, and absorbed costs over months of elevated import duties, the refund question is not academic. It is a balance sheet question with potentially transformative implications and one the trump supreme court standoff has left dangling without resolution.

The Pattern

What the administration’s multi-track response reveals is less a trade policy and more a legal attrition strategy: when one authority is struck down, deploy another; when the clock runs out on a temporary measure, have a permanent one ready; when a narrow ruling leaves remedies unaddressed, let the uncertainty linger while the next mechanism takes shape. The supreme court tariffs decision was a major blow. But the White House is betting that by the time the legal system fully catches up, the economic architecture will have shifted enough to make reversal structurally impractical.